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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DANA GRAMLICH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

vs.

:

JAY P. MUNSEY. M.D. ,
RICHARD HORNE, D.C., and
MOAB FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC
CLINIC,

:

Case No. 900466
Oral Argument
Priority No. 16

:

Defendants/Appellant.
JURISDICTION
The order appealed from was entered June 4, 1990.

(R. 138-

40.) The order dismissed the case as against Jay P. Munsey, M.D.,
only; Richard Home, D.C., and Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic
remained parties. A determination of finality was entered pursuant
to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) on September 17, 1990.

(R. 172-74.)

Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on October 2, 1990.
76.)

(R. 175-

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1990).
ISSUES PRESENTED
A.

Is the

sixty-day

period

for

filing

a

request

for

prelitigation panel review in a medical malpractice action a
jurisdictional requirement, the violation of which will justify
dismissal of an action? This is a question of statutory construction reviewed by this Court for correctness, with no particular
deference to the determination of the trial court. Avila v. Winn.
794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990).

B.

Is

the

prelitigation

panel

review

process

unconstitutional violation of equal protection principles?

an
This

presents a question of law to be reviewed by this Court for
correctness.
C.

State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Was defendant's statute of limitations defense barred

where there was an administrative determination that all statutory
requirements regarding prelitigation review had been satisfied,
and defendant did not appeal from or otherwise challenge that
administrative determination?

This is a question of law decided

by summary judgment, and should be reviewed by this Court for
correctness.
D.

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988).

Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff's motion for

new trial on the ground that no trial had been conducted? Although
the granting of a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court, the issue of whether a new trial was available
is a question of law to be reviewed by this Court for correctness.
Gaw v. State, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 28 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

A copy of the version of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (1987,
current version in Supp. 1990) in effect at the times relevant to
this action is set forth in the appendix. The statute was amended
in 1989, but the changes are relatively minor and would not have
affected this action.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a civil action seeking

damages for medical malpractice.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

filed her Complaint on June 15, 1988.

(R. 1-6.)

Plaintiff

Defendant Jay P.

Munsey, M.D. filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on October 10,
1989.

(R. 49-51.)

16, 1990.

The motion was granted by ruling entered May

(R. 132-35.)

entered June 4, 1990.
On

July

A formal order granting the motion was

(R. 138-40.)

19, 1990, plaintiff

filed

a motion

seeking a

determination of finality pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b).
163-64.)

The motion was granted by a Determination of Finality

entered September 17, 1990.

(R. 172-74.)

notice of appeal on October 2, 1990.
C.

(R.

Statement of Facts.

Plaintiff filed her

(R. 175-76.)

Plaintiff consulted with defendant

Jay P. Munsey, M.D., on March 18, 1985, complaining of a numbness
in the right side of her face and hand.
Dr. Munsey on October 15, 1985.

She again consulted with

(R. 2, 16-17.)

Dr. Munsey failed

to diagnose that plaintiff had a brain tumor at the time she
consulted with him, and his failure to properly diagnose the
condition was a departure from the applicable standard of care.
(R. 86.)
On January 5, 1986, plaintiff suffered a convulsive seizure,
during which it appeared that her heart stopped and that she

3

stopped breathing. She was resuscitated, and ultimately underwent
surgery to remove the tumor.

(R. 3.)

On or about December 21, 1987, plaintiff serveid a notice of
intent to commence action on the defendants.
in Appendix F.)

(R. 53, 66-68; copy

Plaintiff served a request for prelitigation

review on March 2, 1988, 68 days after service of the notice of
intent to commence action.

(R. 96.)

Plaintiff served an amended notice of intent to commence
action on or about March 4, 1988.

(R. 53, 72-75; copy in Appendix

G.)
In connection with the prelitigation panel review proceedings,
Dr. Munsey filed a Motion for Order Denying Request for Prelitigation Panel Review with the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing of the Department of Commerce.

(R. 105-

07.) The motion requested the Division to deny plaintiffs request
for prelitigation review dated March 2, 1988, on the ground that
it was not filed within 60 days of the service of the notice of
intent to commence action.

(Id.)

The Division nonetheless

conducted the prelitigation panel review, and on May 6, 1988, the
director of the Division certified that "all requirements set forth
in §78-14-12, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, have been satisfied
regarding prelitigation review of the above-entitled matter." (R.
109.)
Plaintiff filed her complaint June 15, 1988.

(R. 1-6.)

Dr.

Munsey subsequently moved for summary judgment, asserting that (1)
the action was barred by the statute of limitations, and (2)
4

plaintiff had not proffered expert testimony showing that her
injuries were caused by Dr. Munsey's negligence.

(R. 49-51.)

Plaintiff subsequently filed a responsive memorandum (R. 95-114),
and also filed an affidavit setting forth expert testimony of
causation. (R. 85-94.)
The motion for summary judgment was considered by the court
without oral argument and a ruling granting the motion on the
statute of limitations grounds was entered May 16, 1990.
35.)

A formal Order was entered June 4, 1990.

(R. 132-

(R. 138-40.)

On June 14, 1990, plaintiff served a Motion for New Trial and
for Reconsideration.

(R. 147-48.)

The motion was filed with the

court on June 15, 1990, and the court signed a ruling denying the
motion on the same date.

(R. 160-61.)

Plaintiff thereafter

perfected this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (1987, current version in Supp.
1990), which provides for prelitigation panel review of certain
medical malpractice actions, was enacted by the legislature in
1985, at the same time as several other modifications to the tort
system in Utah.

No statement of the statute's purpose or justi-

fication for its classification was set forth in the enacting bill,
and no evidence on the subject was presented before the trial court
in this case. The experience with the prelitigation review process
subsequent to the enactment shows that the statute in fact serves
no purpose.

No rational justification can be articulated for

applying the terms of the statute to negligence actions against
5

doctors, chiropractors, hospitals, dental hygienist, and others,
while the statute does not apply to negligence actions against
dentists, lawyers, engineers, or to other professionals.

The

statute violates the uniform operations of laws provisions of the
Utah Constitution, Utah Const, art. I § 24.
The trial court improperly failed to consider: plaintiffs
constitutional
process.

challenges

to

the

prelitigation

panel

review

The constitutional arguments were raised in a timely

motion for new trial. The trial court held that a new trial motion
was not available where no trial had been held.

This conclusion

was erroneous, and this Court should consider the constitutional
arguments to have been properly raised before the trial court.
Even if the statute is held to be constitutional, it can be
constitutional only if it is not a jurisdictional bar to commencing
an action. The statute7s evident purpose is to help eliminate nonmeritorious claims prior to commencing of an action.

Nothing in

the statute evinces an intent to create a second statute of
limitations; yet that is how the statute was applied in the instant
matter.

The 60-day requirement for filing a request for pre-

litigation panel review must be interpreted to be a non-jurisdictional requirement, one which may be extended by the prelitigation*
review panel or by the court.

The panel in the instant case

evidently agreed to accept the request for prelitigation panel
review, even though it was a few days late.

The review was held,

and the director of the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing issued an affidavit that all requirements relating to
6

prelitigation panel review had been satisfied.

Defendant was

required to seek judicial review of that determination within 30
days

if defendant

disagreed

with

the Directors

conclusion.

Defendant did not do so, and is now bound by the Directors
determination.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SIXTY-DAY FILING REQUIREMENT OP
§ 78-14-12 IS NOT A JURISDICTIONAL BAR.
Point II of this brief argues that the prelitigation panel
review

process

creates

an

unconstitutional

denial

of

equal

protection and results in a non-uniform application of the laws.
Although plaintiff submits that the prelitigation panel review
process is unconstitutional in any event, the unconstitutionality
is exacerbated if the 60-day filing requirement is viewed as a
jurisdictional bar to proceeding with an action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2) (1987, current version at Supp.
1990) states that a party commencing a medical malpractice claim
shall file a request for prelitigation panel review within 60 days
after serving a notice of intent to commence action.

The statute

does not set forth the effect of a failure to so file within 60
days.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1987), provides that where a notice
of claim is filed less than 90 days prior to the expiration of the
statute of limitations (which arguably occurred in this case if the
statute commenced to run on January 5, 1986), the limitations
7

period is extended to 120 days from the date of service of the
notice.

This 120-day extension is meaningless if the 60-day

limitation of § 78-14-12

is interpreted

as a

jurisdictional

limitations period, since a failure to request a panel hearing
within 60 days would bar the action even though there remained 60
days of the 120-day extension.
If the 60-day requirement is interpreted as a jurisdiction
bar, it becomes a statute of limitations in and or itself.
is no

indication

requirement

was

of any
meant

to

legislative
be

a

intent that the

limitations

trap

for

There
60-day
unwary

plaintiffs. The prelitigation panel review process was established
not to place additional obstacles in the path of injured plaintiffs, but rather to "provide other procedural changes to expedite
early evaluation and settlement of claims." Utah Code Ann. § 7814-2 (1987).
The trial court in the instant case interpreted the 60-day
requirement
limitation.

of

§

78-14-12

as

creating

a

second

statute

of

This interpretation contrary to the evidence of

legislative intent to lengthen the statute of limitations as
evidenced in subparagraph 3 of the statute, which states that "the
filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this
section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until 60 days
following the issuance of an opinion by the prelitigation panel."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3) (1987, current version at Supp. 1990).
There is no evidence of legislative intent that the statute be
interpreted

as was done by the trial court.
8

See Tewari v.

Tsoutsouras, 75 N.W.2d 1, 549 N.E.2d 1143, 1146, 550 N.W.S.2d 572
(1989) (failure to timely file notice in medical malpractice action
would not warrant dismissal where there was no evidence the
legislature

"contemplated the imposition of such a draconian

sanction for noncompliance")1.
Other deadlines exists in litigation, such as those associated
with discovery, but a failure to meet them does not result in
dismissal or rob the court of jurisdiction.

Rule 6 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure provides further guidance. Under Rule 6,
extension is allowed for all except a very few specified procedural
deadlines.

Those exceptions involve appeal or other attempts to

get relief from a prior judicial determination. The 60-day period
at issue in this case clearly does not relate to a prior judicial
determination; rather, it relates to a preliminary matter leading
up to a determination.

As such, it should not be applied as an

inflexible bar to litigation, but rather as a deadline which may
be extended.
If the 60-day requirement of § 78-14-12 is interpreted as an
extendable deadline, plaintiff's claim would not be barred.

Her

request for prelitigation panel review was made approximately 68
days after her notice of claim, and was well within the 12 0-day
extension

of

the

limitations

period

provided

by

§ 78-14-8.

A concurring opinion in Tewari further noted that the failure
to timely file the notice was due to "law office failure," not the
fault of the plaintiff, and stated that "the power to dismiss
actions for xlaw office failure7—even when so fundamental a
document as a pleading is involved—is not to be lightly implied."
549 N.E.2d at 1149 (Kaye, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
9

Defendant filed a motion to have the request for prelitigation
panel hearing stricken as untimely, but the panel nonetheless
proceeded with the prelitigation panel review.
treated

the

60-day

requirement

as

The panel thereby

non-jurisdictional,

and

implicitly accepted the request for prelitigation panel review as
timely.2
If

the

court

nonetheless

determines

that

the

60-day

requirement is jurisdictional, then the limitation must be stricken
as unconstitutional.
1980),

a

mandatory

In Aldana v. Holub, 381 So.2d 231 (Fla.
mediation

was

terminated

prior

to

its

conclusion, which left the plaintiff without a remedy since the
limitations period had run.
inflexible, and then stated:

The court found the limitation to be
"Equally clear, however, is that in

the cases before us the absolute jurisdictional periods in [the
statute] served to deprive petitioners of due process. It is basic
to our scheme of justice that a person aggrieved by fundamental
unfairness in the judicial process have the right and opportunity
to remedy that unfairness."

381 So.2d at 23 6.

The court later

stated:
The result we reach here is indeed
ironic.
The medical mediatio act is unconstitutional because applies ion of its
rigid jurisdictional periods has proven arbitrary and capricious in operatior yet the act
cannot
be
remedied
by
en~ rging
the
2

Point III of this brief points out that the director of the
Department of Occupational and Professional Licensing, which
conducts the pre-litigation panel review, determined that all
requirements of § 78-14-12 were satisfied in this case. Defendant
did not appeal from or seek judicial review of that determination,
and is now bound by it.
10

jurisdictional periods or permitting continuances or extensions of time, for to do so
would constitute a denial of access to the
courts. We are left, then, with a statute
which
is
intractably,
and
incurably,
defective.
381 So. 2d at 238.
The same reasoning applies here.

Should the court interpret

the 60-day period as an inflexible statute of limitation, then it
must be simultaneously invalidated as unconstitutional.
POINT II
THE PRELITIGATION PANEL REVIEW PROCESS IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OP EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES.
In Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P. 2d 348 (Utah
1989), this Court stated that the uniform operations of laws
provisions of the Utah Constitution, Utah Const, art. I § 24,
requires a two-part test to insure the uniform operation of laws:
"First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class.
Second the statutory classifications and the difference given the
classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable
tendency to further the objectives of the statute."
352 (citation omitted).

775 P.2d at

This Court stated that statutes limiting

recovery rights in the medical malpractice area are subject to
heightened

scrutiny, whether

referred

to

as

intermediate

or

realistic rational basis. 775 P.2d at 356. This Court also stated
that the open courts provision is an extension of the due process
clause; thus the due process balancing test also applies. 775 P.2d
at 356.

The due process test balances the reasonableness of the

legislation against the rights protected by the Constitution.
11

This Court's heightened scrutiny approach is consistent with
that of other state supreme courts which have applied heightened
scrutiny to medical malpractice legislation.

See e.g., Carson v.

Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 932-33, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980) (applying
an intermediate standard of scrutiny to invalidate medical malpractice legislation); Farley v. Enqelken, 241 Kan. 662, 740 P.2d
1058 (1987) (holding that medical malpractice plaintiffs are a
"semi-suspect" class, and invalidating medical malpractice legislation) ; Arneson v. Olsen, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978); and Jones
v. State Board of Medicine. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976),
cert, denied, 431 U.S. 914

(1977)

(applying an

intermediate

standard of scrutiny to invalidate a statutory cap on damages, and
remanding with

instructions to apply the same constitutional

principles

legislation

to

establishing

medical

malpractice

screening panels).
Applying the reasonableness test of heightened scrutiny as set
forth in Condemarin above, the statute at issue, § 78-14-12, must
fail.

Under the second part of the test quoted in Condemarin, the

classification and treatment must be based on differences which
reasonably tend to further the objectives of the statute.
recently

published

report

evidences

that

the

requirement

A
of

prelitigation panel review has failed to further the stated purpose
in § 78-14-2 of expediting early evaluation and settlement of
claims.

In Carnahan

& Pullins, A

Survey

of Practitioners'

Perceptions of Utah's Medical Malpractice Pre-Litiqation Program,
3 BYU J. Pub. L. 105 (1989), a survey of one hundred seventy-two
12

attorneys who had gone before the prelitigation panels in Utah led
to the conclusion that the prelitigation panel review process has
not furthered the stated purposes:
The statistics indicate that the [prelitigation
panel
review
process]
is
ineffective: an overwhelming majority of the
practitioners surveyed stated that their
opinion of the case did not change as a result
of the hearing.
Further, only a slight
majority of the total group saw the process as
beneficial in defining the issues or in
screening cases from District Court.
In addition, unlike most forms of
alternative dispute resolution that statistically favor the petitioner/plaintiff, the
data from this study shows an opposite result.
Here, over 80% of the cases pre-screened
received a non-meritorious finding. Such a
reversal might be result of the dominance of
the medical professional on the panel or the
non-binding nature of the proceedings.
The panel program is costly in several
important respects. . . . It is also expensive for the litigants in terms of additional
attorney fees and other costs associated with
the delay.
The proceedings cost the professionals on the panel in that they are only
nominally compensated for their time.
During the first year of the program
(1985), filings for hearings exceeded Division
expectations by two hundred percent. Such a
statistic poses a question of whether this
panel approach may actually increase the
number of cases that are pursed.
The cost
efficiency of such a program is also drawn in
question by the possibility that additional
expenses incurred in connection with mandatory
non-binding arbitration may out weigh the
savings realized by a reduced number of cases
going to trial. "Moreover, once the costs of
a panel hearing have been incurred, the
incremental costs of proceeding to trial are
reduced, which tends to encourage litigation."

13

BYU

J.

Pub. L.,

Malpractice;

at

132-33

(quote

from

P.

Danzon, Medical

Theory, Evidence and Public Policy 200 (1985)).

Because the prelitigation panel review process has failed in
serving the purpose of expediting early evaluation and settlement
of malpractice claims and has actually increased the financial and
procedural burdens placed on malpractice plaintiffs, it currently
serves no other purpose than to place unforeseen traps in the path
of malpractice plaintiffs.
Moreover, regarding the constitutionality of the statute as
already interpreted by the court, it should be noted that even
under a rational basis standard, § 78-14-12 should not be upheld.
In Boucher v. Saveed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983), the Rhode Island
Supreme Court applied the rational basis test and invalidated that
state's medical malpractice screening panel statute as a violation
of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
The court noted that although a medial malpractice insurance crisis
may have existed in Rhode Island at the time the statute was
enacted, no such crisis existed the time of the challenge.
A.2d at 93.

The court stated:

459

"Absent a crisis to justify the

enactment of such legislation, we can ascertain no satisfactory
reason for the separate and unequally treatment that it imposes on
medical malpractice litigants.

The statute constitutes special

class legislation enacted solely for the benefit of specially
c,fined defendant health care providers."

459 A.2d at 93.

In a similar manner, the Wyoming Supreme Court in Hoem v.
State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1988), held unconstitutional the Wyoming
14

medical malpractice screening panel statute on the ground that the
statute

violated

provision.

the

statue

constitution

equal

protection

The court applied the rational basis test and noted

that there was no evidence in the record showing that a medial
malpractice crisis existed in Wyoming or elsewhere.
stated:

The court

"It cannot seriously be contended that the extension of

special benefits to the medical profession and the imposition of
an additional hurdle in the path of medical malpractice victims
relate to the protection of the public health."

756 P.2d at 783.

Similarly, here in Utah no showing has been made that a
medical malpractice crisis now exists in Utah, whether or not a
crisis actually existed at the time the statute was enacted. Under
the heightened level of scrutiny applicable to claimed violations
of the equal protection of the laws, the burden is on the party
asserting constitutionality to demonstrate a legitimate legislative
purpose served by the statute.
P.2d

1343,

1350

(Utah

State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd, 786

1990);

Condemarin,

775

P.2d

at

368

(Zimmerman, J. concurring); Farley v. Enqleken, 241 Kan. 663, 740
P.2d 1058, 1061 (1987).

In the absence of such a showing, the

prelitigation panel review requirement only places a burden in the
path of medical malpractice plaintiffs. Such an arbitrary classification cannot be upheld but must be struck down as unconstitutional, especially in the face of the serious nature of most
medical malpractice injuries.
The arbitrary nature of the special benefits extended to the
medical profession by the prelitigation panel review process is
15

highlighted by the fact that under the current version of the
statute, actions against dentist are not governed by the statute,
whereas actions against dental hygienists and other health care
providers are.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(1)(a) (Supp. 1990).

appears obvious that there can be no realistically

It

rational

explanation for the statute which applies to physicians, hospitals,
and dental hygienist, but does not apply to dentists, lawyers,
engineers, or other professionals.

The statute creates an un-

constitutional classification resulting in a nonuniform application
of the laws.

The statute is unconstitutional and should be so

declared by this Court.
POINT III
DEFENDANT IS BOUND BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATION THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF § 78-14-12
WERE SATISFIED.
Following plaintiff's request for a prelitigation panel review
in this case, defendant filed a motion with the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing requesting the Division to
deny the request for prelitigation panel review.

(R. 105-07.)

Notwithstanding the motion, the panel conducted the prelitigation
review.

Following the review, the Director of the Division of

Occupational and Professional Licensing issued his Affidavit of
Compliance, certifying that all requirements of § 78-14-12 had been
satisfied in this matter.

(R. 109, copy in Appendix H.)

The decision of the Director that the requirements of § 7814-12 had been satisfied was an agency determination of the legal
interests of the parties.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(1)(a) (Supp.
16

1990) . If defendant was dissatisfied with the determination of the
Director, defendant was required to seek judicial review within 30
days.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3) (1989).

Defendant

failed to timely

seek judicial review of the

Director's determination that the requirements of § 78-14-12 were
satisfied and is now barred from now challenging that determination.
Defendant may argue that § 78-14-14 precludes judicial review.
That section, however, only precludes judicial review of the
decision or recommendations of the panel.

No statutory provision

prohibits judicial review of the Director's determination that the
statutory requirements were satisfied.

The defendant waived any

challenge he may have had to the timeliness of plaintiff's request
for prelitigation panel review, and the district court erred in
failing to give preclusive effect to the Director's determination
on that issue.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR FOR RECONSIDERATION.
Following the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for
summary judgment, plaintiff timely served a Motion for a New Trial
and for Reconsideration.

The trial court denied the motion on the

same date it was filed, asserting that a motion for new trial does
not lie where no trial has occurred.
was incorrect.

The trial court's assumption

A motion for new trial is a proper way to seek

reconsideration of a case decided on summary judgment.
17

Moon Lake

Electric Association, Inc. v. Ultrasvstems Western Constructors.
Inc. , 767 P.2d 125, 127-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Robinson & Wells.
P.C. v. Warren. 669 P.2d 844, 848 (Utah 1983).
Although the grant of a new trial or reconsideration is
normally vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, the
trial court must apply correct legal principles in exercising its
jurisdiction.

Where the trial court applied the incorrect legal

standard, plaintiff is entitled to have this case reversed with
instructions to the trial court to reconsider the arguments in
plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial and for Reconsideration. Ferris
v. Jennings. 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979); Gaw v. State. 143 Utah
Adv. Rep. 27, 28 (Ct. App. September 13, 1990).
CONCLUSION
The requirements for prelitigation panel review set forth in
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 1990) are unconstitutional.

The

trial court erred in dismissing the case because of plaintiff's
failure to strictly comply with the requirements of that statute.
The case should be reversed to allow it to proceed to trial on the
merits.
Even if the statute is held to be constitutional, this Court
should hold that the time requirements are not jurisdictional.
Plaintiff substantially complied with the provisions of the statute
and a prelitigation panel review was actually conducted. Defendant
was not prejudiced in any way by the approximately eight-day delay
in requesting the review.

Defendant waived any objection by

failing to seek judicial review of the determination by the
18

Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing that all
requirements regarding prelitigation panel review had been satisfied.
The judgment of dismissal should be reversed, and this case
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
DATED this 3rd day of January, 199:

DON R. PETERSEN
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 3rd
day of January, 1991.
Elliott J. Williams, Esq.
Elizabeth King Brennan, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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APPENDIX "A"

Ruling on Defendant Munsey's
Motion for Summary Judgment

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County

^

MAY 1 6 1990
CLERK OF THSCodST

y

Deputy

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DANA GRAMLICH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
I
]

RULING ON DEFENDANT MUNSEY'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

;

JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D.,
]i
MOAB FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC
]
CLINIC,
Defendants.

Civil Nos. 5686

The defendant, Jay P. Munsey, has filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment contending that there is no genuine issue of
material fact relative to plaintiff's failure to comply with
the Statute of Limitations that is applicable to this action.
The plaintiff has filed an objection to the granting of the
Motion, and both parties have submitted their Memorandums of
Legal Points and Authorities and supporting documents and
affidavits.
Oral arguments were requested and set for May 7, 1990,
and neither party appeared at the time set so the Court finds
that oral arguments have been waived, and rules on the Motion
as here and after stated.
The undisputed facts show that Dr. Munsey commenced
treating the plaintiff for a nervous disorder in March of 1985,
and did not diagnose a brain tumor during that treatment period.

That the plaintiff suffered a seizure on January 5,
1986, and underwent surgery for the removal of a brain tumor
on January 9, 1986.
On December 21, 1977, plaintiff's attorney served
defendant Munsey with a Notice of Intent to Commence Action,
and stated that the negligence was discovered on January 5,
1986.
The plaintiff failed to request a pre-litigation
review as specified in Section 78-14-12(c) within the 60 days
as mandated in that Section.
The plaintiff then served a new Notice of Intent to
Commence Action on defendant on March 4, 1988, which stated
that the negligence was discovered on January 20, 1988.
The question of when the two year Statute of
Limitations begins to run has recently been reviewed by the
Utah Court of Appeals in Deschamps v. Pulley, 12 3 Ut.Adv.Rep.
34.

It is quite clear from a review of that case and the legal

principles set forth that the plaintiff in this case knew, or
should have known, on January 5, 198 6, and certainly no later
than January 9, 1986, that she had suffered an injury and that
this injury was caused by negligence.
It would be obvious to any reasonable person at that
time that the Doctor had failed to properly diagnose her
nervous system disorder and that there was the possibilty, and
even the probablity of negligence.
2

The service of the first intent to commence action was
timely, but when the plaintiff failed to request the
pre-litigation panel review within the time limitation as
specified, that notice became null and void.
The service of the second notice of intent to commence
action was beyond the two year Statute of Limitations as
required for the commencement of this type of action.
THEREFORE, the Court grants the Motion for Summary
Judgment as to defendant Jay P. Munsey, and authorizes an order
dismissing this case as to him.
The Attorney for this defendant is directed to prepare
findings and a formal order in accordance with this opinion.
DATED this

/ 3

day of May, 1990.

3
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RULING ON DEFENDANT MUNSEY'S MOTION
by depositing the same in the United

States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Elliott J. Williams
Elizabeth King Brennan
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City UT
84145
Don R. Petersen
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys at Law
12 0 East 3 00 North
Post Office Box 778
Provo UT
84603
Thomas J. Erbin
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Attorneys at Law
City Center I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City UT
84111

DATED this /£ZA-

day of May, 1990.

Secretary

APPENDIX "B

Order

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County

m

J UN

i\ 1990

CLERK OF THE COURT J

BY

Oepyiy

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
1

DANA GRAMLICH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

]
]

JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D., RICHARD
HORNE, D.C., and MOAB FAMILY
CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC,

)
]
]
i

Civil No. 5686

Defendants.
Defendant James P. Munsey, M.D.'s Motion for Summary
Judgment having been fully briefed, and both parties having
waived oral arguments originally scheduled for May 7, 1990,
and plaintiff being represented by her attorney, Don R.
Peterson of Howard, Lewis & Petersen, and defendant having
been represented by his attorneys Elliott J. Williams and
Elizabeth King Brennan of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, and
the court having reviewed the Memoranda of Points and
Authorities and supporting documents and Affidavits and being
fully advised, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted since there is no
genuine issue of any material fact relative to plaintiff's
failure to comply with the statute of limitations applicable

to this action and defendant is entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law as reflected by this Court's ruling on
this matter dated May 15, 1990.
FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the above
entitled action be and the same hereby is dismissed with
prejudice as to the defendant Jay P. Munsey, each party to
bear its own costs.
DATED this

^
/ '

day of June, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

— O _

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing

ORDER

by depositing the same in

the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Don R. Petersen
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys at Law
Delphi Building
12 0 East 3 00 North
P. 0. Box 778
Provo UT
84603
Elliott J. Williams
Elizabeth King Brennan
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City UT
84145
Richard Home, D.C.
MOAB FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC
478 Millcreek Drive
Moab UT
84532
DATED this /^f-

day of June, 1990.

Secretary

APPENDIX "C"
Motion for New Trial and
For Reconsideration

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County
m

DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN

JUN 1 5 1990.
Cl^RKOFTHECOUg^^/

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

***** s:gram-mot.dlp
Our File No. 17,857

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DANA GRAMLICH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
AND FOR RECONSIDERATION

vs.
JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D., RICHARD
HORNE, D.C., and MOAB
FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC,
Defendants.

Civil No. 5686
Judge Boyd Bunnell

Plaintiff hereby moves this Court, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a), for a new trial
or hearing in this matter. The grounds for this motion is that the Court's ruling is contrary
to the evidence presented and based on an error in law.
Plaintiff further moves this Court, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), to reconsider
its ruling on defendant Munsey's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The ground for this

motion is that the Court's ruling is contrary to law and based on a statute which is
unconstitutional, and the interests of justice dictate that plaintiff be permitted to present
additional arguments and law relevant to the issues.

These motions are supported by a memorandum of authorities which is filed
herewith.
DATED this / ^

day of June, 1990.

DON R. PETERSEN and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this / ^ ^

day of June, 1990.

Elliott J. Williams
Elizabeth King Brennan
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Richard Home, D.C.
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic
478 Millcreek Drive
Moab, Utah 84632

APPENDIX "D"
Ruling on Motion for New Trial
and For Reconsideration

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County
RUB

JUN t 8 1990
CLErtKOFTHECOUB?

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR. GRAND CCttfl4>¥—~^~
STATE OF UTAH

DANA GRAMLICH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
|
])

RULING ON MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL AND
FOR RECONSIDERATION

]

JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D., RICHARD
HORNE, D.C., and MOAB FAMILY
CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC,
Defendants.

|
]
i
;

Civil No. 5686

The plaintiff has filed a motion for a new trial
under Civil Procedure Rule 59(a), and for the Court to
reconsider its prior ruling granting summary judgment to
defendant Munsey, and states that she is relying on Civil
Rule 54(b).
Neither one of these Rules have any application to
plaintiff's Motion since there was no trial, and certainly a
motion for new trial could not be granted.

Rule 54(b) has no

application since there is no rule providing for a motion to
reconsider a matter that has already been fully determined.
The plaintiff in her memorandum attempts to reargue
matters already determined by the Court, and further attempts
to assert additional matters of constitutionality of statutes
that should have been presented during the prior
determination.

For these reasons, the Court hereby denies the
Motion for a New Trial and for any reconsideration.
DATED this

AS>

day of June, 1990.

BOYD-' BIJNNEJrfL, T>ist£ic£< Judge

-20002

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing
FOR RECONSIDERATION

RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND
by depositing the same in the United

States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Don R. Petersen
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys at Law
120 East 300 North
P. 0. box 778
Provo UT
84603
Elliott J. Williams
Elizabeth King Brennan
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City UT
84145
Richard Home, D.C.
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic
478 Millcreek Drive
Moab UT
84532

DATED this /SXX^

day of June, 1990,

Secretary

APPENDIX "E"
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (1987)

78-14-12. Department of Business Regulation to provide
panel — Procedures established by department
— Procedures for requesting panel — Notice —
Statute of limitations tolled — Composition of
panel — Members to receive per diem and travel
expenses — Department authorized to set license
fees of health care providers to cover costs of
administering panel.
(1) The Department of Business Regulation shall provide a hearing panel
in alleged medical malpractice cases against health care providers as defined
in § 78-14-3 filed after July 1, 1985. The department shall establish procedures for prelitigation consideration of personal injury and wrongful death
claims for damages arising out of the provision of or alleged failure to provide
health care. The proceedings are informal and nonbinding, but are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation. Proceedings conducted
under authority of this section are confidential, privileged, and immune from
civil process.
(2) The party initiating a medical malpractice action shall file a request for
prelitigation panel review with the Department of Business Regulation
within 60 days after the filing of a statutory notice of intent to commence
action under § 78-14-8. The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent
to commence action. The request shall be mailed to all health care providers
named in the notice and request.
(3) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this section
tolls the applicable statute of limitations until 60 days following the issuance
of an opinion by the prelitigation panel. The opinion shall be sent to all
parties by certified mail, return receipt requested.
(4) The department provides for and appoints an appropriate panel or
panels to accept and hear complaints of negligence and damages, made by or
on behalf of any patient who is an alleged victim of negligence. The panels are
composed of:
(a) one member appointed from a list provided by the commissioners of
the Utah State Bar, who is a resident lawyer currently licensed to practice law in this state who shall serve as chairman of the panel;
(b) one member who is licensed under § 78-14-3, who is practicing in
the same specialty as the proposed defendant, appointed from a list provided by the professional association representing the same area of practice as the health care provider; or in claims against only hospitals or
their employees, one member who is an individual currently serving in
hospital administration and appointed from a list submitted by the Utah
Hospital Association; and
(c) a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, hospital employee, or
other health care provider, and who is a responsible citizen of the state,
selected and appointed by a unanimous decision of the members comprising the panel.
(5) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify, under oath, that
he or she is without bias or conflict of interest with respect to any matter
under consideration.
(6) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall receive per diem compensation and travel expenses for attending panel hearings as established by
rules of the Department of Business Regulation.
(7) In addition to the actual cost of administering the licensure of health
care providers, the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the
Department of Business Regulation is authorized to set license fees of health
care providers within the limits established by law equal to their proportionate costs of administering prelitigation panels. None of the costs of administering the prelitigation panel shall be borne by the claimant, except as provided under § 78-14-16.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-12, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 238, § 1; 1986, ch. 170, § 2; 1987,
ch. 92, § 159.

APPENDIX "F"

Notice of Intent to Commence Action

NOTICE OF INTENT TO COMMENCE ACTION

TO:

Jay P. Munsey, M.D.
82 North Main
Moab, Utah 84532
Richard Home, D.C.
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic
478 Millcreck Drive
Moab, Utah 84532

You are hereby given notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1987) that
this office has been retained by Dana Gramlich and that she intends to commence an
action against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., Richard Home, D.C, Moab Family Chiropractic
Clinic, and any other business under which either of you may have done business
during the time period in question. Pursuant to the cited statute, you are also given
notice of the following:
1.

Nature of the Claim. This claim is for the negligent failure of each of

you to diagnose and properly treat a brain tumor suffered by Mrs. Gramlich.
2.

Persons Involved.

The victim of the negligence was Dana Gramlich.

The claim of negligence is made against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., Richard Home, D.C, the
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic, and any and all other entities or persons under which
the named individuals did business or which would be liable for the negligence of the
named individuals.
3.

Date. Time and Place of Occurrence.

The negligence occurred from

March, 1985, through January 5, 1986. The negligence of Dr. Munsey occurred at his
office at the address listed above. The negligence of Dr. Home occurred at his office
at the address stated above.

The negligence was discovered by Mrs. Gramlich on

January 5, 1986.
4.

Circumstances of the Occurrence and Specific Allegations of Misconduct.

In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich began to experience a numbness in her fingers and face

and a general unwell feeling. On March 16 Mrs. Gramlich called Dr. Munsey who told
her that she probably had a pinched nerve and advised her to lay down with a hot
pack.

On the same day, Mrs. Gramlich again called the doctor and inquired whether

the symptoms could be the result of a brain tumor, and was assured that that was not
the case.

In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich was examined by Dr. Munsey at his office.

She again inquired whether she might have a brain tumor and asked that he refer her
to a neurologist, and he stated that she did not have a brain tumor and dismissed her
concerns as frivolous. Dr. Munsey prescribed medication for circulation, but it did not
help. Mrs. Gramlich advised Dr. Munsey that the medication was not working, and he
advised her to continue taking it.
In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich was examined by Dr. Home with respect to the
same symptoms described above.

Mrs. Gramlich also stated her concern that there

might be a brain tumor. Dr. Home examined Mrs. Gramlich, took x-rays, assured her
that she did not have a brain tumor and proceeded to treat her for a pinched nerve.
Mrs. Gramlich continued with the treatment from Dr. Home for several months.
Dana Gramlich was treated by Dr. Munsey and Dr. Home periodically during the
rest of the year 1985. They assured her she had no brain tumor.
On January 5, 1986, Mrs. Gramlich experienced a severe seizure during which
her heart stopped and she stopped breathing, but she was resuscitated by her husband.
It was subsequently discovered that Mrs. Gramlich had a brain tumor, and surgery to
remove the tumor was performed on January 9, 1986.
The failures of Dr. Munsey and Dr. Home to diagnose Mrs. Gramlich's brain
tumor was negligent and a departure from the duty of care which they each owed to
her.
5.

Nature of Injuries. The full extent of Mrs. Gramlich's injuries is not

known at present.

Her injuries include, however, the following:
^

She is required to

take medication to reduce the possibility of future seizures. The medication made her
subject to an increased risk that any children she had would have had birth defects.
She also has an extreme fear of the possibility of a subsequent seizure, which fear
causes her on-going distress and suffering.

She has not regained her strength or full

use of her extremities and will continue to have permanent disability as a result of the
surgery.
GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY.
DATED this -<V

day of December, 1987.

^ ^ ^ £
DON R. PETERSEN, for.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Dana Gramlich

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH )
Dana Gramlich, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that she has read the

foregoing Notice of Intent to Commence Action and that the statements contained
therein are true to the best of her knowledge, information and belief.

DANA GRAMLICH
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this C< I

day of December, 1987.

J22

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

Residing at:

•t

oM.

APPENDIX "G"

Amended Notice of Intent to Commence Action

AMENDED NOTICE TO COMMENCE ACTION
TO:

Jay P. Munsey, M.D.
82 North Main
Moab, UT 84532
Richard Home, D.C.
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic
478 Millcreek Drive
Moab, UT 84532
You are hereby given notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1987) that

this office has been retained by Dana Gramlich and that she intends to commence an
action against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., Richard Home, D.C, Moab Family Chiropractic
Clinic, and any other business under which either of you may have done business
during the time period in question. Pursuant to the cited statute, you are also given
notice of the following:
1.

Nature of the Claim. This claim is for the negligent failure of each o£

you to diagnose and properly treat a brain tumor suffered by Mrs. Gramlich.
2.

Persons Involved.

The victim of the negligence was Dana Gramlich.

The claim of negligence is made against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., Richard Home, D.C, the
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic, and any and all other entities or persons under which
the named individuals did business or which would be liable for the negligence of the
named individuals.
3.

Date. Time and Place of Occurrence.

The negligence occurred from.

March, 1985v through January 5, 1986_ The negligence of Dr. Munsey occurred at hisoffice at the address listed above. The negligence of Dr. Home occurred at his office
at the address stated above.

The negligence was discovered by Mrs. Gramlich on

January 20, 1988, after receiving a report from Dr. Warren F. Gorman.
4.

Circumstances of the Occurrence and Specific Allegations of Misconduct.

In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich began to experience a numbness in her fingers and face
and a general unwell feeling. On March 16, Mrs. Gramlich called Dr. Munsey who told
her that she probably had a pinched nerve and advised her to lay down with a hot

pack.

On the same day, Mrs. Gramlich again called the doctor and inquired whether

the symptoms could be the result of a brain tumor, and was assured that was not the
case. In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich was examined by Dr. Munsey at his office.

She

again inquired whether she might have a brain tumor and asked that he refer her to a
neurologist, and he stated that she did not have a brain tumor and dismissed her
concerns as frivolous. Dr. Munsey prescribed medication for circulation, but it did not
help. Mrs. Gramlich advised Dr. Munsey that the medication was not working, and he
advised her to continue taking it.
In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich was examined by Dr. Home with respect to the
same symptoms described above.

Mrs. Gramlich also stated her concern that there

might be a brain tumor. Dr. Home examined Mrs. Gramlich, took x-rays, assured her
that she did not have a brain tumor and proceeded to treat her for a pinched nerve.
Y

Mrs. Gramlich continued with the treatment from Dr. Home for several months.
Dana Gramlich was treated by Dr. Munsey and Dr. Home periodically during the
rest of the year 1985. They assured her she had no brain tumor.
On January 5, 1986, Mrs. Gramlich experienced a severe seizure during which
her heart stopped and she stopped breathing, but was resuscitated by her husband. It
was subsequently discovered that Mrs. Gramlich had a brain tumor, and surgery to
remove the tumor was performed on January 9, 1986.
The failure of Dr. Munsey and Dr. Home to diagnose Mrs. Gramlich's brain
tumor was negligent and a departure from the duty of care which they owed to her.
5.

Nature of Injuries. The full extend of Mrs. Gramlich's injuries is not

known at present.

Her injuries, however, include the following:

She is required to

take medication to reduce the possibility of future seizures. The medication made her
subject to an increased risk that any child she had would have had birth defects. She
also has an extreme fear of the possibility of a subsequent seizure, which fear causes
2

her on-going distress and suffering.

She has not regained her strength or full us£of

her extremities and will continue to have permanent disability as a result of the
surgery.
GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY.
DATED this J l L day of March, 1988.

DON R. PETERSEN, for.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Dana Gramlich
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH )
Dana Gramlich, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that she has read the
foregoing Amended Notice of Intent to Commence Action and that .the statements
contained therein arc true and to the best of her knowledge, information and belief.

DANA GRAMLICH
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this y

day of March, 1988

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

Residing at:

3

S E N O E R J poroplett Items i. 2;3 $nd 4
Put your address In the *'R€TUHty 1 U'{ space on the
reverse tide Failure )o do this will prevent this card from
being returned to you, The return receipt tfe will provide
you the name o* the person delivered to end the date of
delivery Fof eddltionel feet the following service* are
eveilable Consult postmaster for feet end checfc boxles)
for serviced) requested.

^

1. D 6how to whom, daft and address of delivery.

c

2. D

to

•-ft

Restricted Delivery,

8

3. Article Addressed to:

Jay P, Munpey, M,Df
82 Nosth Matin
Moab, UT 84532
4. Type of Service;

Article Number

D Registered
P Insured
Certified
• COD
Express Mali

P 123 519 581

^

,

2. O

Restricted Delivery.

Richard H o m e , D.C.
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic
478 Millcreek Drive
Moab, UT 84532
4. Type of Service:
D Registered
D Insured
*~" Certified
• COD
Express Mail

. ,

Article Number

P 123 519 575

Always obtain signature of addressee £L*QGrU * n d
PATE DELIVERED.
O
O

5. Signature — Addressee
fa/gent
6. Signature — (ygant

7. Date of Delivery*

o
8. Addressee's Address (ONL Y [frequented and fee paid)

1. D Show to whom, dete and address of delivery.

3. Article Addressed to:

Always obtain fignatuia of addressee or aoent and
PATE DEI IVtcRED. ,
-%

^

S E N D E R ; Complete items 1 . 2 , 3 and 4.

Put your address in the ' • R E T U R N T O " space on the
/averse side Feilure to do this will prevent this card from
being returned to you. The return receipt fee will provide
you the name of the person delivered to end the date of
delivery. For additional fees the following services are
available Consult postmester for fees end check box(es)
for servicers) requested.

x
7. Data of Oalivary

8. Addressee's Address (ONL Y if requested and fee paid)

APPENDIX "H"

Affidavit of Compliance

j £ 2s -^ £» * cf s»sy

L1AY 1 01988

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Hr'^- .*». Wells Building
13 v. tc* I 300 South, P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 530-6628

HOWARD- LEWIS & PET3SE*

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH

Case No. PR-88-03-014

DANA GRAMLICH
Petitioner,

:
AFFIDAVIT OF
COMPLIANCE

-vsJAY P. MUNSEY, M.D. and
RICHARD HORNE, D.C.

:
Respondents,

:

I, David E. Robinson, Director, Division of Occupational & Professional
Licensing, Department of Business Regulation, hereby certify that all
requirements set forth in §78-14-12, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, have
been satisfied regarding prelitigation review of the above-entitled matter.

Dated this 6th day of May, 1988.

David E. Robins
Director

S T A T E

S E A L

